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The plausible release of deeply engineered or even entirely synthetic/artiﬁcial microorganisms
raises the issue of their intentional (e.g. bioremediation) or accidental interaction with the Environ-
ment. Containment systems designed in the 1980s–1990s for limiting the spread of genetically engi-
neered bacteria and their recombinant traits are still applicable to contemporary Synthetic Biology
constructs. Yet, the ease of DNA synthesis and the uncertainty on how non-natural properties and
strains could interplay with the existing biological word poses yet again the challenge of designing
safe and efﬁcacious ﬁrewalls to curtail possible interactions. Such barriers may include xeno-nucleic
acids (XNAs) instead of DNA as information-bearing molecules, rewriting the genetic code to make it
non-understandable by the existing gene expression machineries, and/or making growth dependent
on xenobiotic chemicals.
 2012 Federation of European Biochemical Societies. Published by Elsevier B.V.1. Introduction
The issue of containment of man-made genetic constructs for
limiting their possible environmental impact can be traced to the
very birth of Genetic Engineering (GE). The development of the
gene cloning technology by Cohen et al. in the early 1970s [1] con-
stituted a revolution for all of the biological sciences, seeded new
industries based on these sciences, and ushered in the era of Bio-
technology. Recombinant DNA methods grew as a standard prac-
tice during the next decade bringing about two important and
simultaneous steps in the synthesis of biological materials. One
was cloning and transgenic implantation, which allowed to easily
transfer DNA segments from given organisms to others and express
their contents in heterologous hosts. The second one was the direc-
ted mutagenesis of given genes by either deletion or allelic replace-
ment. This period of time witnessed the arch-famous Asilomar
Conference in 1975 and its proposals for guidelines and self-regu-
lation on the use of genetic constructs [2,3]. Although many spe-
ciﬁc recommendations were largely ignored in subsequent years,
Asilomar laid the foundation for most of the biosafety measures
in place today for both biological and physical containment. Inter
alia, the conference expressed that containment should be madeal Societies. Published by Elsevier
de Biotecnología (CNB-CSIC),
34 91 585 45 06.
zo).an essential consideration in any experimental design and that
the effectiveness of the containment should match, as closely as
possible, the estimated risk. Since it was difﬁcult to predict the bio-
safety threats of these new experiments, recommendations men-
tioned at that time stressed the exercise of an extra vigilance.
However, they also foresaw that over the years GE practitioners
would learn more about the actual risks in order to gradually
decrease the (pre)caution to a realistic level. The now standard
Biological Safety Levels (BSL) 1–4 were established and some types
of experiments with highly pathogenic organisms (for humans,
animals and plants) were even ruled out for the time being.
Although the meeting put on the short run a considerable focus
on safety matters, the following years witnessed a growing indif-
ference on the issue, specially in non-medical biotechnology devel-
opments. One likely reason is the lack of accidents with this
technology that could seriously back the tremendous hostility that
was raised at the time by some groups that gained public audience.
Yet, there has been little evidence for any serious mishap that
could be directly linked to the accidental or intentional release of
engineered microorganisms. In the meantime, a large number of
incidents involving natural pathogenic bacteria and viruses have
indeed happened. There have been also largely publicized effects
of crops engineered to express the insecticidal Bacillus thuringiensis
toxin (BT) on non-target species (other than the stem borer), the
importance of which seems to be a matter of opinion [4]. In con-
trast, the overwhelming facts that stem from many studies onB.V.Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license. 
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suggests that engineered constructs are not any worse than natural
counterparts and most often they are less ﬁt to survive outside the
laboratory [5]. This tones down the claims on immediate dangers
while it raises questions on what is to be done to avoid them in
the future, should such dangers ever materialize.
What are the conclusions from the conventional (not yet syn-
thetic) recombinant DNA era regarding containment and biosafety?
Research on introduction and acceptance of novel transformative
technologies (for instance, the automobile or the aviation,
let alone medicine) shows that accidents help more than any other
circumstance to improve the safety of the next stage of the same
technology (Fig. 1). In reality, after many decades of genetic engi-
neering and massive production of recombinant bacteria it is naïve
to think that they have never escaped the laboratory. They often
have, and massively. Even if autoclaving and other safety proce-
dures were 99.999% efﬁcient, a good deal of recombinant materials
(i.e., live bacteria and functional DNA) have found their way into
the environment through the sinks and the untreated residues of
numerous laboratories worldwide. Proof of escape of transgenes
and hybridization with wild relatives have been shown with the
GM creeping bentgrass, used on US golf courses [6,7] and unin-
tended transgene survival and dispersal has been demonstrated
in Mexico via the maize seed systems [8]. Yet, these are somewhat
minor occurrences compared to the worst-case scenarios that were
predicted during the onset of the cognate technologies 40 years
ago [9]. That no engineered microbe has even been traced to any
disease or has caused any detectable problem is an indicator that
safety measures have so far been sufﬁcient (or that forensic meth-
ods to this end have worked poorly). In contrast, natural pathogens
occasionally escape the laboratory and cause diseases [10–13].
Also, the World has witnessed in recent the emergence of numer-
ous new epidemics, pests and environmental disasters, but none of
which had any connection with genetic engineering. GE pathogens
(mostly viruses) created by scientists for research purposes [14–
16] have –so far– not left the laboratory. Furthermore bacterial
agents (unfortunately) contemplated in biological warfare up to
now [17] are of natural origin. This is not surprising because the
complexity of pathogen–host interactions is so intricate that cur-
rent knowledge makes the invention of novel virulence determi-
nants really difﬁcult, but not impossible for the future. A number
of engineered viruses, such as the interleukin 4 enhanced mouse-
pox supervirus [18], the humanized infectious bat SARS-like
coronavirus [19], the reconstitution of infectious, human fossil
endogenous retrovirus [20], or the recently engineered H5N1 virus,Fig. 1. Safety increases as a consequence of learning lessons from accidents. The
graph shows the evolution of the motor-vehicle-related deaths per million vehicle
miles travelled (VMT) and annual VMT, by year in the USA during the period (1925–
1997). The data suggests that every accident is followed by implementation of
safety measures to avoid it happening again. Reproduced with permission from
[101].demonstrate an uncomfortable truth. As Declan Butler described in
the December 20, 2011 issue of Nature: ‘‘. . . virologists have sug-
gested that any genetic changes that made it more transmissible
would probably blunt its deadliness. The new work seems to con-
tradict that comforting idea. . .’’ (http://www.nature.com/news/
fears-grow-over-lab-bred-ﬂu-1.9692). Although the engineered
H5N1 virus is a very unusual example of GE, it cannot be ignored.
If Synthetic Biology ever happens to fulﬁl its promises of systems
engineering of living organism, we need to revisit the biosafety dis-
course of the last decades and shed some new light on it. Fortu-
nately, the issue of endowing engineered constructs with a
degree of safety beyond their mere physical containment (or regu-
lations for their manipulation) has been dealt with before. For the
sake of stocktaking, some outstanding instances are discussed
below.2. Engineering bacteria for release and programming their
death
Research on biosafety risks over the last decades has produced a
body of information that turns out to become a useful background
to address current safety concerns on contemporary and future
synthetic genomes and non-natural microorganisms. One special
aspect of such a research on genetically engineered microorgan-
isms (GEMs) for environmental release [21–23] dealt with the
engineering of circuits for the containment of modiﬁed bacteria
and their recombinant (trans)genes. The notion, pioneered by
Søren Molin [24,25] contemplated the possibility that GEMs could
be endowed with conditional lethality circuits to either program
their death at a given time or once they had completed their mis-
sion [26,27]. Note that the novelty of such active containment was
altogether different from the much earlier concept borne in the
Asilomar Conference that advocated the use of multi-auxotrophic
strains as the recipients of recombinant DNA with the purpose of
decreasing the chances of survival in the environment [2,3]. The
downside of this otherwise judicious concept was that the pro-
posed strains were so weak that they were rendered nearly useless
for biotechnological applications and even for routine laboratory
work. In contrast, active containment pursued the vigorous perfor-
mance of the cells of interest where and when desired, until a
known signal appeared in the stage that triggered a quick death.
In the following years, the ﬁeld of biological containment
boomed with multiple propositions for conditional suicide circuits
aimed at decreasing the viability of cells should they enter unde-
sired situations or reach their time [26,28–32]. The propositions
ranged from simple schemes (for instance, making growth of the
GEM dependent on an essential intermediate compound that could
not be synthesized by cells: diaminopimelic acid or thymidine) all
the way to intricate genetic circuits that programmed cell death
once a target environmental pollutant was degraded by the engi-
neered bacteria [33]. What is important is that cell death does
not mean the disappearance of its DNA. There is a large body of evi-
dence that the genetic material of dead recombinant organisms re-
main perfectly active and transferable in the environment [34].
Furthermore, meteorological phenomena such as lighting might
promote DNA uptake in natural settings [35]. Along this line, smart
designs were proposed for inhibiting acquisition of recombinant
genes from GEMs into other bacteria whether through natural
transformation or by an active process of horizontal gene transfer
(HGT). Many of these schemes did work both in laboratory condi-
tions as well as in microcosms. These mimicked to some extent the
environmental conditions that GM bacteria were expected to face
upon release. But the dream of perfectly contained bacteria re-
ceived a serious blow in 2003 with a study showing that there
was a limit to the efﬁciency of containment circuits of any type
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sophistication of the genetic design, not less than one cell in one
million can always escape the conditional lethality device or the
HGT traps, and eventually survive. Given the fact that 1 ml of a
grown standard bacterial culture has more than 108 cells, it is clear
that such approaches to containment – beautiful as they are – do
not solve the problem. The reason for this was the activity of mo-
bile insertion sequences that populate the chromosomes of envi-
ronmental bacteria and hop randomly between DNA segments of
the cells in vivo. This circumstance ends up knocking out both
endogenous systems of conditional viability and toxic genes that
could be associated to the horizontally transferred genes.
A second dividend of the intensive research of risk assessment
of GEMs during the late 1980s and the whole 1990s was the devel-
opment of a whole series of genetic tools tailored for designing
bacteria destined for environmental release. The question at stake
was how to ensure the stable maintenance of transgenes without
any antibiotic selection and without being burdensome to microor-
ganisms that have to operate in the open ﬁeld. Many of these prob-
lems could be addressed with the so-called transposon vectors
bearing non-antibiotic or excisable selection markers, which spec-
tacularly upgraded the genetic engineering and manipulations that
could be done with Gram-negative bacteria other than Escherichia
coli [32,36–38]. Such vectors permitted the multiple and stable
implantation of long DNA segments in desired hosts, avoided the
use of antibiotics, decreased the chances of horizontal gene trans-
fer [39] and avoided the unpredictability of having the transgenes
cloned in plasmids. One of the vectors was designed to produce
GEMs that were indistinguishable from non-engineered counter-
parts (the so-called recombinant but quasi-natural bacteria [40]).
With >3000 citations and despite recent improvements [41] the
original papers describing such mini-transposon vectors remain
to this day as the classical references of genetic tools for environ-
mental release and other biotechnological applications. Yet,
regardless of the abundance of assets for designing acceptably safe
for bioremediation, the ﬁeld of GEMs for the environment has been
progressively losing steam in more recent years. The ultimate rea-
son for this has not been safety concerns or lack of public accep-
tance, but the hard facts on their poor behaviour as in situ
catalysts [42]. This stagnation has, however, changed recently with
the onset of Systems and Synthetic Biology [43], which allows to
take a multi-scale approach to the same problem and to come up
with much safer and predictable methods for impeding the inter-
play between the natural and the man-made biological constructs.3. From genetic engineering towards new-to-nature (NTN)
agents
The reliance of Genetic Engineering on synthetic nucleic acids
started in 1978 with the development of oligonucleotide-based
site directed mutagenesis procedures, which won the Nobel Prize
for its creator, Smith [44]. The major problem of making the mu-
tants out of a population of wild-type sequences was brilliantly
solved later by Kunkel [45], what started to create a sizable de-
mand for chemically produced oligonucleotides. But by that time,
their synthesis was a complicated and expensive endeavour that
had to wait until 1988 (the year of the publication of the polymer-
ase chain reaction method, PCR) to start becoming a standard and
affordable material in Molecular Biology and Biotechnology labora-
tories. Site-directed mutagenesis and PCR not only allowed the
deliberate change of speciﬁc codons of proteins and regulatory re-
gions, but also highlighted the need of synthetic oligonucleotides
for the ultimate modiﬁcation of selected genes at will. The landing
of synthetic DNA in microorganisms as oligonucleotides boomed
with the generalization of PCR for countless applications, includingthe generation of large DNA segments produced in vitro from a
pre-existing template sequence. But for many years the de novo
chemical synthesis of complete genes was still a fastidious, expen-
sive and time-consuming exercise. Things started to change in the
early 2000s with the development of powerful techniques for the
complete synthesis of long DNA segments (e.g. in the kilobase
range), along with complementary methods for the assembly of
such segments into still longer pieces. The process of producing
longer and longer DNA sequences á la carte – together with hosts
for their expression – continues to this day [46]. Recent landmarks
include the complete synthesis of a functional chromosome of
Mycoplasma mycoides of 1.08 Mo bp [47]. It is paradoxical that such
an impressive ability to synthesize DNA does not match our much
more limited knowledge to forward-engineer genetic devices with
more than 20 genes or biological parts [48,49]. This places the SB
ﬁeld in a territory where designing new-to-nature properties will
still rely for some time on trial-and-error approaches where emer-
gence of unexpected, perhaps undesirable traits might certainly
occur. This type of – increasingly – synthetic bacteria could mutate
in an unpredictable manner, or its DNA be captured by other mi-
crobes where it can also behave erratically. In view of past experi-
ences with traditional GE discussed above, the ultimate biosafety
challenge of SB is the implementation of absolute reliability, what
has been called Certainty of Containment (CoC, [50]). CoC means
that the probability of escape from containment, dissemination
and unintended interaction with the environment must be virtu-
ally zero. The idea therefore is to move from Genetically Modiﬁed
Organisms into Genetically Secured Organisms.4. Prospective containment systems for SynBio agents
Themain conclusion of the large body of literature on systems for
containing recombinant constructs, whether it deals with recombi-
nant DNA parts only or thewhole engineered strains, is that barriers
based on physical restraints or conditional suicide circuits are soon-
er or later defeated. If Darwinian evolution that is inherent to living
systems always ﬁnds away out, how canwe dare to think of a CoC as
entertained above? In recent times a collection of intriguing propos-
als has been entertained to address this question. Many of them do
not pose setting barriers between natural and synthetic agents á la
GEMs, but to develop alternative, altogether artiﬁcialmolecular lan-
guages that – by deﬁnition – cannot communicate with the extant
biochemistry of the existing live world. This is expected to prevent
genetic cross-talk, impede any point of encounter with natural bio-
logical systems and thus bring genetic interactions to practically
zero. Not surprisingly, most proposals for orthogonalization of syn-
thetic agents deal with the upstream components of the gene
expression ﬂow. Those amazed by the extraordinary optimum of
the natural DNA structure might be surprised by recent efforts to
free up information-bearing molecules from evolutionary con-
straints linked to them.One canbeperplexedby theamazingbiolog-
ical diversity on our planet and still be stunned about the chemical
uniformity of present biological life.Whilewe see countless eukary-
otic and prokaryotic species, they all run on the same hard- and soft-
ware of Life. But, under the Synthetic Biology paradigm, scientists
and engineers try to produce alternative unnatural molecules and
semantic architectures [51] in order, eventually, to create full xeno-
biological systems. One possibility in this context is the adoption of
non-canonical nucleotides, base pairs and codes that can impede
HGT and thus establish what could be called a genetic ﬁrewall [52].
The ﬁeld of alternative nucleic acids and alternative genetic systems
is thriving at the time ofwriting this article and cannot be covered in
its entirety. Readers are directed to various reviews dealingwith the
issue [53–55], while we address below some illustrative cases that
are more relevant to the problem of containment.
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Size-expanded DNAs are DNA-like molecules in which the base
pairs are expanded by a process called benzo homologation. The
resulting genetic helices are called xDNA (expanded DNA) and
yDNA (wide DNA). When singly substituted into natural DNA, they
are destabilizing because the benzo-expanded base pair size is too
large for the natural helix. However, when all base pairs are
expanded (Fig. 2), xDNA and yDNA form highly stable, sequence-
matching double helices [56]. In one case (xDNA) the idea is ben-
zo-fused design of pyrimidines that would match a theoretical geo-
metric expansion of purines and thus allow for the combination of
expanded versions of A, G, C, and T with the natural base comple-
ments and allow them to form a regular helix. This leads to the
new deoxyribosides dxT and dxC, and to the complete set of ex-
panded DNA (xDNA) nucleosides. The base pair designs for xDNA
are in some respects closely analogous to those of DNA, but are also
different in important ways. Natural DNA sequences are composed
of one of four letters at each position, and involve purines paired
with pyrimidines. In xDNA, benzopurines are paired with pyrimi-
dines and benzopyrimidines with purines, and there are eight com-
ponents of xDNA with four types of ring systems. In a second case
(yDNA) the helix is widened also through a different way of
increasing the size of a base pair by benzo fusion. This results in
different tautomeric preferences of the resulting y bases. Despite
these alterations in the resulting structure, the resulting NAs are
functional [57] and thus xDNA and yDNA are candidates for com-
ponents of new, operative genetic systems.
4.2. Xeno-nucleic acids (XNAs)
Another attempt to come up with unnatural nucleotides focuses
on the backbone or the outgoing motif of the DNA. Originally this
research was driven by the question of how life evolved on earth
and why RNA and DNA were selected by (chemical) evolution over
other possible nucleic acid structures [58]. Systematic experimen-
tal studies aiming at the diversiﬁcation of the chemical structure of
nucleic acids have resulted in completely novel informational bio-
polymers. Fig. 3 shows examples in which the poly-P-deoxyribose
polymer that holds the sequence of bases in DNA has been replaced
by alternative carbohydrates with a different number of carbonFig. 2. Size-expanded architecture of xDNA, in which xA, xC, xT, and xG bases are
paired opposite natural bases. The two backbone strands of the resulting double
helix is wider than normal DNA. The containment angle is that DNA with a different
width cannot invade the others’ standard gene expression machinery that has
evolved to deal with normal-size DNA [57]. The concept is not altogether different
of the XIX century notion on preventing military invasions from neighbouring
countries by using different widths of railroad tracks. Reproduced with permission
from [57].atoms. Although the genetic information is still stored in the four
canonical base pairs, natural DNA polymerases cannot read and
duplicate this information. In other words the genetic information
stored in XNA is invisible to the information-processing machiner-
ies of natural cells and therefore useless to DNA-based organisms.
Alternatively (or in addition) one can incorporate one or more non-
natural variants of the canonical nucleotides to the XNA sequence.
These scenarios are in principle optimal to keep the distance be-
tween the engineered and the existing biological world [52]. To
this end it is imperative that no natural polymerase can convert
DNA into XNA, or DNA into XNA, as long as the genetic information
is still encoded in 4 bases using triplet encoding. Orthogonality of
information storage will likely come about through a series of
sequential small steps and developments. In a nutshell, the most
important challenges to be solved before a XNA-based safe organ-
ism can exist in vivo include: (i) chemical synthesis of single
stranded XNA, (ii) the production of hosts that are auxotrophic
for synthetic xeno nucleotides, using either variants of the four
canonical bases (xAMP, xGMP, xTMP, xCMP) or altogether different
bases, (iii) deﬁning and biosynthesizing highly speciﬁc enzymes
that can handle XNA replication (i.e. XNA polymerase, helicase, li-
gase, single strand binding proteins), transcription (RNA polymer-
ase, XNA-binding transcription factors) and possibly also XNA-
binding nucleoid-associated proteins to form large scale genome
structures, (iv) replacing DNA-based genome by XNA-based coun-
terparts and (v) possibly removing ATP, CTP and GTP from cell
physiology. While the tools and the knowledge to entirely imple-
ment such an agenda maxima are not yet in sight, many advances
can be recorded in the right direction. One bottleneck for imple-
menting a biological system based on XNA is indeed the availabil-
ity of XNA-dependent replicative polymerases. This requires a
separate effort for developing enzymes speciﬁc for such alternative
substrates, as naturally occurring counterparts incorporate xenobi-
otic nucleotides rather poorly [59–61]. That the entire endeavour
of substituting DNA by XNA may not be impossible after all is
hinted at by a recent work of Marliere’s and Mutzel’s Laboratory
[62] on the production of an E. coli strain whose DNA is composed
of canonical A, C and G nucleotides but has the synthetic thymine
analogue 5-chlorouracil instead of T in the corresponding positions
of the sequence. These cells are, expectedly, dependent on exter-
nally supplied 5-chlorouracil for growth, but otherwise they look
and behave as normal E. coli. This approach thus sets two concom-
itant ﬁrewalls for any interaction with other bacteria, because the
strain is auxotrophic for a non-natural chemical and it contains a
form of DNA that cannot be deciphered by other organisms [50,63].
4.3. Extended genetic alphabet
Experiments replacing or enlarging the genetic alphabet of DNA
with unnatural base pairs led for example to a genetic code that in-
stead of four bases ATGC had six bases ATGCPZ [64–66]. In another
study 60 candidate bases (that means 3600 base pairs) were tested
for possible incorporation in the DNA [67]. These unnatural bases
are not recognized by natural polymerases, and one of the chal-
lenges is to ﬁnd/create novel types of polymerases that will be able
to read the unnatural constructs. At least on one occasion a modi-
ﬁed variant of the HIV-Reverse transcriptase was found to be able
to PCR-amplify an oligonucleotide containing a third type base pair
[64,66,68,69]. Other examples of this sophisticated chemistry in-
clude e.g. novel hydrogen-bonding patterns between analogues
of canonical bases [54,65,67,70–73] and combination of an ex-
tended genetic code (see below; [74–77]) with adequate novel
polymerases [66,78,79] could certainly lead to the next step to-
wards implementing an artiﬁcial genetic system in vivo [63,64].
Although not fully functional at the moment, initial in vitro exper-
iments demonstrate that this area of research has long left the
Fig. 3. Some examples of XNAs. The ﬁgure shows three cases where the poly-P-deoxyribose polymer that serves as the scaffold of the sequence of nucleotides in DNA has
been replaced by poly-P-glycol, poly-P-hexose and poly-P-threose, originating, respectively, GNA, HNA and TNA. Note that such replacements still allow formation of
information-bearing double helixes as represented on top (see [52] for a review).
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4.4. Orthogonal ribosomes, alternative codons and non-natural amino
acids
One of the goals of contemporary SB is the development of
orthogonal systems (from molecules to entire organisms) that
determine traits typical of live objects but do not interact with
the existing biological frame [80]. In reality, full orthogonality in
engineered biological systems (as opposed to, e.g. electronics or
mechanical engineering) is not yet at hand. The most conspicuous
cases of such forward-designed orthogonality are those in which
otherwise unused codons are reassigned to match transfer RNA
(tRNA)/aminoacyl-tRNA synthetase pairs in order to either change
codon speciﬁcity or expand the number of genetically encoded
amino acids towards non-natural specimens. This leads to the
in vivo incorporation of the non-natural amino acids into proteins
in response to non-sense codons [77,81] (see [82] for a review).
Cells endowed with such aminoacyl-tRNA synthetases are thus
able to read mRNA sequences that make no sense to the existing
gene expression machinery [83]. These modiﬁed genetic codes al-
low the design of growingly complex circuits and systems that
hardly interact with the host [55,84]. But can one organism be
completely redesigned to bear new codon usages? More recently,
Isaacs et al. [85] reported the replacement of all 314 TAG stop co-
dons present in the genome of E. coli with synonymous TAA co-
dons, thereby demonstrating that massive substitutions can be
combined into higher-order strains without lethal effects. The pos-
sibility of reassigning the function of large number of triplets opens
the perspective to have strains that cannot exchange productively
any information with the natural biological world. Moreover, these
approaches are by no means limited to bacteria and can also be
implemented in yeasts and in mammalian cells in culture
[86,87]. Just to show how far the issue of expanded genetic codes
can go, a wealth of current efforts are directed to develop biological
alphabets based on quadruplet codons [74,88]. The key in this case
is the evolution of a specialized orthogonal ribosome that efﬁ-
ciently decodes a series of 4-base codons, providing an equally
orthogonal messenger RNA, which it speciﬁcally translates. By cre-
ating mutually orthogonal aminoacyl-tRNA synthetase-tRNA pairs
and combining them with such ribosomes one can direct the incor-
poration of a large number of distinct unnatural amino acids and
thus bring about the synthesis and the synthetic evolution of unnat-
ural polymers in cells [74]. By the same token, there is no reason
why other codons with still more bases cannot be entertained. As
mentioned above, a recent work from Benner’s Laboratory [89]
proposes the expansion of the 4-letter standard nucleotides (G, A,
C, and T) with two additional non-standard compounds (Z and
P). To this end mutant polymerases and PCR conditions weredeveloped that ampliﬁed a wide range of GACTZP DNA sequences
having multiple consecutive unnatural synthetic genetic compo-
nents. The ﬁeld is expected to bloom in the next few years.
Could all these developments be merged in a single gene
expression ﬂow that is alien to our familiar biology? The best sce-
nario from the point of view of containment would be that of cells
in which DNA has been replaced by XNAs and endowed with an
enzymatic machinery á la carte (XNA polymerases) for replication.
In a further step towards orthogonalization of non-natural mi-
crobes, one could envision combining XNAs with matching RNA
polymerases that produce transcripts with expanded or alternative
genetic codes that could incorporate non-natural amino acids to
proteins as well. While these developments are still in a very
embryonic stage, they can inspire a research agenda that merges
efﬁcacy and safety of synthetic organisms in the same lot to estab-
lish a fully functional genetic ﬁrewall [52]. The more orthogonal
one system is (from parts to whole organisms), the more predict-
able and less risky it could be [50].5. Thinking out-of-the-box
Virtually all containment systems discussed in the last dec-
ades are based in what we could call familiar biochemistry.
However, it may well happen that living systems (or at least bio-
logical objects) can be assembled with a different set of building
blocks or with an alternative relational logic. One intriguing
possibility put forward by Doron Lancet is that biological infor-
mation can be stored and replicated through the lipid composi-
tion of vesicles instead of the physical order of bases in nucleic
acid sequence [90–92]. Such entities may be viewed as having a
sort of compositional genome which could propagate biological
information without any genetic apparatus [91]. It is not impos-
sible to entertain the future creation of life forms based on such
mechanism of bearing information, which would be alien to our
familiar genetics and thus unable to interact with existing living
entities. A second scenario could be that of mirror life, the under-
lying basis being the viability of biological objects with an alter-
native chiral biochemistry. At the 2010 Astrobiology Science
Conference in League City (Texas), for example, the session Ori-
gins of molecular asymmetry, homochirality and life detection dis-
cussed the possibility of mechanisms for chiral symmetry
breaking and ampliﬁcation (http://www.lpi.usra.edu/meetings/
abscicon2010/pdf/sess503.pdf). Speciﬁcally, Paul Davies specu-
lated that Earth hosts, or has hosted, more than one form of life
where amino acids and sugars may have had reversed the chiral
signature that is familiar to standard life. While not much hard
data on this subject can be found in the scientiﬁc literature
one can ﬁnd a good deal of activity in the ﬁeld in various Syn-
thetic Biology laboratories (http://arep.med.harvard.edu/SBP/),
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www.wired.com/magazine/2010/11/ff_mirrorlife/all/1). The out-
come of a possible encounter between molecular mirroring
forms of life is difﬁcult to predict, but it could well happen that
they were completely unable to talk to each other and thus set a
ﬁrewall to any possible risk. Finally, one could think on synthetic
organisms with a genomic chassis programmed for a limited life
span. This concept, pioneered by Danchin [93–95] is based on
the hypothesis that cells have a sort of Maxwell’s demon’s genes
that allow cells to discriminate between old and new proteins
during division, thereby ensuring that newborn cells are formed
with entirely fresh materials and the aged building blocks ear-
marked for destruction. These genes could include e.g. the
ATP-dependent subunit of Clp prokaryotic proteases that choose
the right functional objects, and destroy the rest. When these
proteins are challenged by antibiotics such as acyl-depsipeptides
they randomly degrade proteins and this kills the cells. Mutants
defective in these functions may therefore age faster and thus be
less risky from the point of view of their environmental release.6. Conclusions and outlook
The onset of Synthetic Biology and the possibility of designing
chromosomes á la carte borne by virtually non-natural microor-
ganisms with chemically produced genomes re-enacts many of
the questions raised for the last 35–40 years on the environmental
impact of recombinant DNA technologies. One current matter of
apprehension involves the risks for health and the environment
that could be foreseen from the accidental or conscious liberation
of microbes that carry synthetic genomes. This article advocates
the question to be framed on the already extensive history and
wealth of data on the design, performance and risk studies made
in the US and Europe on GEMs destined for in situ bioremediation
under non-contained conditions. The behaviour of such agents pro-
vides a suitable background for tackling the uncertainties raised by
the new synthetic microbes that are in sight. The homeostasis of
the existing microbial communities gives modiﬁed or altogether
artiﬁcial bacteria a severe disadvantage to prosper as free entities
in the natural ecosystems [5]. The remaining tiny risk of GEMs
escaping and establishing themselves in the environment is now
tackled through xenobiological systems. Although it is early days,
xenobiology might solve the ultimate challenge of providing re-lia-
ble Certainty of Containment via a genetic ﬁrewall.
New and emerging technologies, described as having a major
impact on society, are frequently accompanied by a rethoric ﬁre-
work of hope, hype and fear. Synthetic Biology, openly declaring
the pursuit of a scientiﬁc and technological agenda that tries to
overcome the natural state of affairs, is no exception. But despite
the new language and the fresh metaphors that surround SB, many
questions on safety and security of microorganisms bearing syn-
thetic genomes have been raised before in connection to Genetic
Engineering. This provides a solid basis to leave behind those
safety issues that were thoroughly addressed and answered in
the past, and tackle the authentically novel safety challenges
[96,97]. Finally, we advocate responsibility of Synthetic Biologists
when communicating these sensitive issues. Scientists involved
in the development of engineered bacteria have frequently com-
plained about the negative public perception and ensuing regula-
tions that their research might be constrained by, while at the
same time more or less surreptitiously fuelling and provoking such
a controversy themselves. One episode of this sort is recounted in
detail by his protagonist, Beckwith, in his autobiography [98]. The
same day of 1969 that he published a paper in Nature describing
the ﬁrst physical isolation of the DNA segment of a gene, he held
an extraordinary press conference in which he warned society ofthe risks that this type of research could embody and the danger
of discrimination and control, including the genetic engineering
of human beings. Needless to say that the press conference re-
ceived international media coverage. We see this pattern being
re-enacted over and over, to the present debate on Synthetic Biol-
ogy and synthetic genomes. Raising awareness on one’s research
topic by playing on the hopes and fears of other people will bring
attention on the short term, but could turn out to be a boomerang
over the long run. GMO biotechnology in Europe, the role of scien-
tists, industry and politics, and its reception in the European public
is one of the most expensive case studies to learn from. For our cur-
rent endeavour we recommend to go ahead step-by-step, with en-
ough precaution or prudent vigilance [96,99,100] being responsive
to feedback from other scientists and non-scientists alike. That
way, we believe, the genetic ﬁrewall will not ﬁre back.
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